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Abstract 
Kenya receives much foreign aid especially for agriculture and 
infrastructure. Despite this, many ooportunities are missed for 
localizing the sources of inputs for these projects. The country 
has skills and installed capacity to manufacture many of these imported 
inputs locally but does not do so partly because much of the aid is 
tied to purchases from the donor countries. In this study, the authors 
selectively review the literature on the impact of tied aid on the 
economic structures of recipient countries. Illustrations are given 
of how more flexible and detailed negotiations for aid could improve 
the demand for the outputs of some industries. The authors also propose 
specific ways of improving Kenya's negotiating ability and tactics that 
may well be applicable to other developing countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Kenya receives much foreign aid, especially for agriculture and 
infrastructure (1). Despite this, many opportunities are missed for 
localizing the sourees of inputs for those projects. Though the skills 
and installed capacity exist locally to manufacture many of these 
imported inputs most are still imported, jhpartly because much of 
the aid is tied to purchases from the donor countries. This study 
selectively reviews the literature on the impact of tied aid on the 
economic structures of recipient countries, though the broad issues of 
the social and political/economic repercussions of aid and the long-term 
strategies needed to reduce dependency and accelerate development are not 
considered here. The way the Kenya Government negotiates for aid is 
examined. Then four case studies are presented to illustrate how more 
flexible and detailed negotiations for aid could improve, the demand 
for certain industries' output. The article proposes specific ways to 
improve Kenya's negotiating ability and advocates new negotiating tactics that 
that may well be applicable to other developing countries. 
THE IMPACT OF TIED AID ON THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURES OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
More than half of all development assistance (i.e. aid) is tied, 
and must be used mostly to purchase goods and services from donor 
countries (OECD 1982: 192). This practice imposes tv/o special problems 
upon Third World countries: extra costs and lower local production. 
Nevertheless, donor countries tie the source of .inputs and services 
purchased with foreign aid for the following reasons (2). 
- to minimize the negative.impact on the balance of payments in 
the donor countryj 
- to counter the practices of other donor countries who also tie 
aid; 
- to utilize excess industrial capacity in the donor country and to 
dispose of surpluses; 
- to generate employment in the donor countryr, 
- to initiate or to sustain the penetration of the recipient 
countryus market by the donor country's corporations; 
- to minimize the cost of giving aid — irrespective of what it costs 
the recipient country to receive the aid. 
- 2 - IDS/VIP 457 
The United States of America started tying aid in the 1950s 
and 1960s in an effort to reduce the balance-of-payments drain on its 
gold reserves. Subsequently, other countries followed suit to promote 
exports or to prevent the pre-emption of export markets by the aid-tying 
practices of rivals (Wightman 1971: 50). 
Despite the extra costs of tied aid for recipient countries, 
bilateral aid is usually tied. As of 1978, only ten of the Development 
Assistance Committee countries — Australia, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United States of 
America — had untied bilateral development loans to permit at least 
some procurement in develoning countries (Kappagoda 1978: 8-9). In 1981, 
54.7% of grants and 72.4% of loans from the United States were tied; 
another 17% and 13.2% were "partially tied". Britain tied 78.3% of its 
grants and 72.4% of its loans, another 1.4% and 2.8% was "partially tied" 
(OECD 1982: 192). About 60% of Canadian aid is bilateral; of this about 
80% is tied (Carty and Smith, 1981: 36). 
Business interests in the donor countries are keen to stave off 
concessions from the principle of tied aid. For instance: 
Ottawa 
In 1975., 7 announced that Canadian aid would be untied 
immediately for bidding by Third World countries. The 
Development Aid committee of the Canadian Export Association 
expressed loud dismay at this miner concession to recipient 
nations .... Government spokesmen soon became equivocal in 
their statements on the chance ... By the err- of 1977, they had 
stopped mentioning it .... (Carty and Smith 1981: 43) 
The United Kingdom, which loosened conditions for tied aid in 
1975, only allowed aid recipients to buy from countries that had a per 
capita income below US$200' (Kappagoda 1978, 8-9). Yet, poor countries usually 
lack the capacity to produce goods or the capability to design and build 
factories and processing plants. Hence, in most cases, the aid from the 
United Kingdom is still tied. The rules penalize potential suppliers 
in Third World countries (Hamilton 1976: 1-21). Moreover, a developing 
country may not purchase inputs or capital from another developing country 
without special permissibn from the Overseas Development Ministry. On 
the other hand, Sweden and Norway do allow aid recipients to spend all 
their bilateral aid on local costs. 
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When aid — especially subsidized loans -- is \tied, the 
recipient country often pays more than world prices because the donor 
is a high-cost producer or the shipping and insurance is also tied to 
high-cost donor sources (Kappagoda 1978:8). Suppliers from donor 
countries can often charge monopolistic prices when aid is tied since 
competition from other suppliers world-wide is excluded. For instance, 
in 20 projects in Pakistan analysed by Mahbub ul Haq (1967: 327), the 
average costs were 51% higher than they would have been with competitive 
bidding. Yassin (1982: 164) also found that the average excess cost 
of aid tying in Sudan was 92.6% for the projects examined. 
Similarly, the . Indian newspaper Business Standard (15 Sept. 
1981 reported that a World Bank Loan of US$450 million for 
for rural electrification had been cancelled because the 
Bank had insisted that the government should accept a 
Canadian loan offer tied to the purchase of aluminium rods 
from Canada; the government had rejected this on grounds 
that the cost of the rods was 45% above the ruling market 
price and that it would therefore be cheaper for India.to 
buy on the open market with Eurodollar finance; the World 
Bank had called off the project, saying that its foreign aid-
requirements were not properly tied up (Hayter and Watson 
1985: 86). 
Aid recipients are usually aware of the problems of aid tying, 
but they accept it because they need foreign exchange for projects. 
In fact, aid recipients can sometimes even increase the amount of aid 
by agreeing to increase the value of the imported components of a project. 
Since mobilizing local finances for public expenditure is often 
difficult. 
....local financing often becomes the bottleneck of the project: 
it is easier for the developing country to use imported gpods 
and services than those that can be bought locally .... 
Projects with high ''development effect" and low import content 
are replaced by projects with lower '"development effect1' and 
higher import content ... (Hamilton 1976: 1: 40). 
This introduces a bias in favour of imported content and 
against local sourcing. Moreover, 
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...even if donors allow some of their aid to he used 
for local costs, the bias is not necessarily removed. 
The World Bank's practice, for instance, is to specify 
that some fixed percentage of a loan may be used for 
local costs, giving the recipient free foreign 
exchange to cover the indirect addition to import demand 
generated by expenditure on the project. This means that 
it is'still the size of the import component that 
determines the size of the loan, and the implicit bias 
remains ... (White 1974: 172). 
Tendler (1975: 58-68) discusses an example of American aid to 
Brazil for construction of a hydroelectric power plant. Prazil 
originally planned to build a 250 megawatt hydroelectric power plant in 
two 125 megawatt phases of seven years each. According to Tendler, 
American aid influenced Brazil to build the 250 megawatt plant in one 
phase in five years even though that canacity was not needed immediately. 
Brazil was also required to buy turbines from the USA though both 
turbines and generators could have been produced in Brazil. She 
concluded that the decision to import deprived the nation of an 
opportunity to strengthen its technological capacilities and gain 
experience. Also, 
... the 250 megawatt, five-year decision meant a greater 
cost, economically and institutionally. It'involved a 
meddling' by assistance entities in recipient-country 
decision making and increased skepticism about the use 
of analytical techniques in project selection (Tendler 
1975:68)„ 
The limited availability of aid to finance the use of local 
consultants, skilled labourers and locally produced goods hinders the 
development of diverse economic sectors in Third World countries (Gray 
1971a; 1971b). This is especially so if aid displaces locally-made 
competing products. Aid can also impede development by enticing an aid 
receiver to postpone plans to generate alternative local supplies. As 
an example of this latter problem Hayter and Watson (1985:256) quote an 
Indian official: 
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In fertilizers, for example, we have the capacity to 
manufacture them ourselves, but this is stultified by 
several people who were brought up by the World Bank, 
... when the World Bank goes for an international tender, they 
go for fhe best technology in the world, which necessarily 
means imports; we lose the will, energy, and desire to 
produce our own ... our failure to raise resources internally, 
which is a political failure, implies that we go to the 
World Bank, in the process we receive imports which are tied 
to specific technologies. These are developed adopted to use 
of India raw materials ... we lose the will to develop on our 
own, even though we have the technicians and the machines. 
Indeed,two Indian fertilizer projects financed by the World Bank 
had at least 25% more import content than one built with tied supplier 
credits and bilateral loans even though these "are at least 30% more 
expensive than normal loans" (Menon .1980: 1441). 
Ill - conceived aid can depress both local agricultural and 
industrial output. For example, Sri Lanka's staple food is rice. Since 
the yield of rice depends greatly on water supply, Sri Lanka's rice 
harvests vary according to the rainfall. To avert potential famine due 
to drought, the government of Sri Lanka encouraged the production of 
sorghum, maize, cassava and yams as substitutes for rice (Kanpagoda 1978: 
14-15). However, during the harvest of these substitute foods in 1975, 
Sri Lanka received "rice aid" from the USA. This diverted demand from 
domestic rice substitutes to "rice aid". Sri Lanka farmers — who had 
been motivated to grow substitutes for rire -- could not sell their 
crops. They became discouraged and quit .growing the substitutes. 
According to Kappagoda (1978: 14-15):. 
A major extension effort by the (Sr* Lanka) Agricultural 
Department received a set-back as the farmers required * 
considerable persuasion to grow these other crops and 
the country's long-term development prospects were 
seriously damaged. 
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m An economic study of American food aid to India in the 1960s also 
revealed that for every three units of food aid received, the local 
production of food dropped by one unit (Mann 1967). 
Third World countries need to be alert to the possibility that 
aid may hinder the growth of local industry.. Aid is sometimes used to 
penetrate local markets and divert demand amy from local firms and towards 
corporations from the donor country. 
If the aid had not been available .in the first place, the 
materials and skills might, in many cases, have been provided 
from local sources. A foreign firm's bid may be supported 
by offers of aid. Thus the Financial Times (28 May 1984) 
reported that Bharat Henry Electrical (BHEL) India's state-
owned power station contractor, was overtaken by General 
Electric company ... backed by the UK government ... the 
fact that a substantial proportion of the cost of imported 
equipment will be covered by grants reduced the power of 
BHEL's arguments (Hayter and Watson 1965; 242). 
When widely practiced, aid tying can also have large adverse 
macroeconomic repercussions for a developing country. For instance, 
Ndulu (1986:19), in an excellent article on Tanzania, examined how, real 
capital investment grew by 51% between 1978 and 1981, while manufacturing 
declined 39,5% . Moreover, 
... the share of industrial capital imports in total industrial 
imports increased from an average 17.3% between 1972 and 1975 
to an average 48% between 1975 and 1980. This was made possible 
by a substantial inflow of external assistance tied to projects, 
given the absolute decline of real export earnings (Ndulu 1986: 19). 
From 1975 to 1980, foreign aid averaraged 34% of total imports 
this rose to 51,6% in 1982. During this period about two-thirds of the 
aid was in the form of grants, many of which were tied. Thus aid contributed 
to the inordinate build-up of underused capital, worsening labour 
productivity and consequent inflation. In addition, the Tanzanian 
Surrency became more overvalued, thus discouraging the exports needed io 
finance imported industrial inputs and spares (Skarstein and Wangwe 1986: 
213). Earlier errors in the selection of highly import-dependent technologies 
and products compounded the problems. Thus despite the large external 
resource inflows, 
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... The inflexibility of their allocation due to tying them 
up to capital goods content of development projects constrained 
their effectiveness. Indeed, flexibility in their use for 
current operational requirements could have substantially 
reduced the loss in growth, even in the face of poor export 
performance registered during the period (Ndulu 1986:22). 
Thus, if the annual rate of growth in real capital investment 
had been decreased from 12.4% to 2.9% and the foreign exchange reallocated 
to import intermediate inputs instead of capital goods, then the annual 
growth of output would have been 5,2% instead of merely 0.7%. between 1973 and 
1981. The dismal macroeconomic performance can be blamed., at least in part, on 
aid-tying. This was especially so since foreign exchange earnings were 
falling and hence extra foreign exchange was not readily available to 
reallocate for purchasing imported intermediates and thereby overcome the 
constraints imposed by aid-tying. Under such circumstances, there was 
little room for manoeuvre. Being tied, the assistance was of help. The nation 
was bound to under-achievement and declining per capita income. 
Though it is not our intention to paint the situation too 
negatively, these examples do illustrate that aid — particularly tied 
aid can impede development. Thus a potential recipient country must 
carefully identify its own interests and negotiate to defend them. 
AID NEGOTIATIONS IN KENYA ; 
In Kenya negotiations for aid are centralized under the Department 
of External Aid in the Finance Ministry. As of 1984, this department was 
dealing with 48 donors, including 25 bilateral and eight multilateral 
donors. The bilateral donors accounted for nearly 60% and multilateral 
donors for 37% of all grants and loans (see Table 1). Thirty-eight per 
cent of the aid was given as grants, the rest as loans. Most grants were 
bilateral or from non-governmental organizations and the United Nations 
system. 
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Multinational organizations tended to lend rather than grant. 
Statistics are not available as to how much aid was "tied", though the 
documented international patterns of development assistance and 
extensive tying is probably applicable to the bilateral aid received by 
Kenya. Industry and the private sector received little aid directly 
— only 4.5% of all grants and loans. Of course, some money spent on other 
categories of aid was used to purhase inputs and services from Kenyan 
industries. 
Officially, Kenya aims to reject aid that promotes the economic or 
political dominance of the aiding country (Kenya Govt. 1965: par.25). 
Nevertheless, Holtham and Hazlewood (1976: 200) have concluded that: 
... while donors, including Britain, are guilty of distorting 
government expenditures, .it is only fair to say that they 
often seern yto be pushing an open door and the Kenya government 
has its own appetite for the grandiose ... 
Edwards (1968:11) and again Holtham and Hazlewood (1976:41) 
observed that projects were often tailored to donor requirements while 
projects and programmes essential for development were reduced or ' 
sacrificed when viewed unfavourably by donors. All these authors noted that 
Kenya tended "to accept aid for imported goods which could be produced 
domestically". Moreover, the amount of aid the Kenya Government receives is 
large, e.g. Kshs.2,040 million in mostly bilateral grants and a nearly 
like amount of loans in fiscal year 1985/86 (Kenya Govt. 1986:62). Thus 
signigificant opportunities to stimulate local industrialization are 
missed. Moreover, in some cases, overpricing and inappropriately designed 
factories and equipment have hamstrung projects for years after their 
initial commissioning. Various examples will illustrate these problems. 
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TABLE 1: Development Assistance'to Kenya 
Number Grants loans Total % 
of 
organisations 
A: On-going aid commitments as of 30 June 1984 
(millions of Kenya pounds) 
Bilateral 25 757.1 625, 5 1,382.7 59 . 5 
NGOs 3 16.4 • 6 16 .9 0 .7 
UN system Z 63.0 " <~i •. O „ 8 66.9 2 .9 
Multilateral 8 56.3 800. 3 856.7 36 .9 
Total 48 892.9 1,430. 2 2323,1 100 .0 
Bs Aid commitments by sector (%) 
Agriculture 23.2 13.9 17.5 
Natural resources 2.5 3.6 3.2 
Health and population 10.7 4.0 7.1 
Energy 9.8 13.9 12.4 
i. 
Education, training and 
social services 13.4 5.8 8.7 
Industry and private 4.0 4.8 4.5 
Water and Urban 7.3 19.3 12.4 
Infrastructure 9.9 31.1 23.0 
Macro economic planning 
and research 
Multi-sector 
7,1 
12.0 
2.4 
.3 
4.2 
4.8 
Total 33.4 61.6 100.0 
Source: Kenya Govt. (1985a). 
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Tractors and a Sugar Factory 
Aid-tying not only increases "the of equipment, but a recipient 
can also be locked into /receivir!i|-iapropriately designed equipment from 
donor suppliers. The increased costs and consequently inordinate finance 
charges, perhaps compounded by a bad choice of equipment, can cause a 
project to be long plagued by inadequte liquidity as well as numerous 
operational problems. 
This is exactly what occurred to the French-assisted Nzoia 
Sugar Factory in Western Kenya (Coughlin 1986). Nearly all the equipment 
came from France, and much of the equipment (e.g. tractors and generator 
turbines) was highly overpriced. For instance, Fives Gail Babcock (FCB) 
charged Kshs. 5.6 million for a 1.3 megawatt turbine in 1978 (February). 
But when asked for its replacement value as a result of an insurance claim, 
FCB .inadvertently revealed the overpricing when it reported that a 
replacement in 1984 would only cost Kshs.2.„l million despite the intervening 
inflation and devaluation of the Kenya shilling. Similarly, Nzoia's 
management reported that , "included in the French Buyers Credit 
Agreement were, agricultural machinery which could have been negotiated at 
better prices and more than 50% of the cost saved'. The high charges 
burdened the plant with unmanageable annual finance charges, even at the 
supposedly reduced interest charges (7.95%). These charges would chew up 
35% of the expected annual sales revenue. The plant was immediately 
crippled with an insuportable financial drain. The continually acute 
liquidity crisis bred numerous secondary problems. 
On top of these inordinate financial charges, the plant was also badly 
designed. The plant was supposed to be able to crush 2,000 tonnes of cane 
per day continuously. But according to all the engineers currently in the 
factory, the plant cannot and never could crush and process more than 
1,600-1,700 tonnes per day on a continual basis. Significant imbalances 
between sections in .the factory exist. But in order to pass the test for 
acceptance of the factory, the then French managers reportedly ran the 
crushing mills for 36 hours at that rate. Then just as the juice processing 
house was jammed full, they stopped the test and declared it to have 
been a successful demonstration of the plant's capacity! The mills 
would have had tp stop anyway to allow the process house to clear. The 
middle level African managers (many of -whom are today's managers) were 
not tricked, but they were unable to communicate the possibility of a fraud 
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to higher authorities. So the 'test" allowed the French suppliers to 
gain official acceptance of the plant and the government's acknowledgement 
of the debt. 
As time passed, other design deficiencies began to reveal them-
selves. Most key pieces of equipment lack the normal backups that can be 
used if the primary equipment breaks down (e.g. pumps, milling rollers, 
boilers, turbine generators, vacuum pans). Since the process is 
continuous, if a breakdown occurs in any one of these, the entire 
plant suffers a partial of complete shutdown. Moreover, compared to 
Kenya's other plants that are rated for 2,000 tonnes per day, this plant 
has the smallest capacity for most key pieces of equipment. As a result 
of these design deficiencies, as soon as the plant became older and more 
Susceptible to breakdown, the critical failure to provide more backup equipment 
became evident in the increasing number fof hours that the entire plant was h 
shut due to breakdowns. 
Handpumps 
Foreign aid is the major source of handpumps in Kenya. 
Sometimes donors drill holes and supply and install pumps. Other times they 
just supply pumps. According to the Ministry of Water Development, the 
major donors of handpumps are (i) the Swedish International Development 
Agency (Coast Province);, (ii) the World Bank (Coast Province); 
(iii) the Kenya Finland Corporation (KENFINCO) (Western Kenya), and 
(iv) various religious agencies throughout Kenya'. (3) Donors import 
many makes of handpumps from diverse producers. As a result, the users f 
usually do not know who the manufacturers are and how and where to obtain 
spare parts. Also, the local manufacture of spares on a one-off basis 
is often expensive or impractical. Hence, many of the donated pumps 
remain unrepaired and the boreholes are idle until, perhaps, a new 
donated pump arrives. The activities of KENFINCO in western Kenya are 
outlined below to • illustrate how the receipt of pipes and pumps given as 
'"aids" actually underdevelops Kenya's productive capacity for handpumps 
and water pipes. 
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Finland is a major donor of water handpumps to Kenya. It supplies 
pumps under a 1981 agreement for the "Rural Water Supply Development E;roject 
in Western Province of Kenya". KENFINCO,a joint venture, was established 
to execute the project. (4) KENFIMCO's oroject area covers 28 locations 
in four districts in the Western and South Nyanza provinces of Kenya. 
As of October 1984, KENFINCO had completed 220 shallow wells and . deep 
borehole wells. Two of the latter were high-yield boreholes for piped 
water supply schemes. KENFINCO had also completed 160 spring protections 
and was about to complete the rehabilitation of water supply systems for 
the towns Kakamega and Shikusa. 
The KENFINCO project is financed by a Finnish grant tied both as to 
procurement and end use. Finnish International Development Assistance 
(FINNIDA) finances the local cost of the water supply project, brings in 
Finnish experts to supervise Kenyan casual workers, and imports Finnish 
water pipes and nearly all the cylinders for handpumps. 
KENFINCO uses three makes of handpumps; the NIRA AF-76, the 
Indian Mark II (with .2" Demster cylinder); and the Malawi Pumps (AFRIDEVE). 
The NIRA AF-76 is imported from Sweden and used in shallow wells. The 
Indian Mark II is made locally by Western College in Kakamega. It is used 
in deep wells. Its cylinder retails for Kshs.3,915. The well-heads for 
the three handpumps are made locally at Western College, Kakamega. 
According to the project manager, the cylinder constitutes about 20% of 
the total cost of a shallow well. The cylinders for shallow wells are 
imported; those for deep well are made locally. (5) Most of the 
cylinders are imported since about 80% of the wells are shallow. Half of 
the spares are manufacturecV at Western College; half are imported. 
Though the local demand fot handpumps is small — only a few 
hundreds per annum — Kenya does have the skills and installed caDacity 
to make handpumps locally. (6) Two firms actually make handpumps and 
at least five foundries in Kenya are technically competent to cast 
handpump cylinders. Various machine shops could finish them. One study 
revealed that if the current demand for handpumps were satistified by 
potential local producers, the pumps would even cost less than comparable 
commercial imports (Begumisa and Coughlin 1986: 12). 
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Though Kenya -lias the proper equipment and skills to produce 
handpumps locally, very few are produced. The major reason is that foreign 
donors supply imported pumps as "aid" instead of buying locally made ones 
to donate. The commercial demand alone is insufficient to allow 
reasonable economies of scale. Instead of assisting Kenya to become self-
reliant by encouraging local industries, the donations perpetuate 
dependence on imported pumps and subsequently needed spare parts. Thus, 
"aid" has kept the Kenyan handpumps industry underdeveloped. 
Steel 
When Kenya negotiated the contract with China to erect the large 
new sports stadium and complex in anticipation of the All-Africa Games, 
it was initially agreed that 311 materials, even cement, should be 
purchased from China. In practice, however, numerous items (e.g. cement, 
plastic pipes, electrical conduits, galvanized roofing sheets and timber) 
have been obtained locally. But still, many locally producible items were 
imported, (e.g. 5,000 tonnes of steel reinforcing rods, ceramic wash basins 
and toilets). The reinforcing rods were mostly 25 mm to 28 mm threaded 
rods which are not made in Kenya. But for such a large order (i.e. roughly 
Kshs.2.5 million), equivalent to two months' production in most local mills, 
the existing local steel mills — three of which are brand new -- could 
easily groove the rolls needed to make those rods. Moreover, if worried 
about the quality of the steel, the Chinese builders could have imported 
steel billets of assured quality and commissioned the hot-rolling locally. 
Kenya imports steel billets in any event, so Chinese imports of billets would 
not have hurt the local scrap steel melters (Co^ghlin 1985a), 
Electrical Cables and Conduits • 
Kenya also imports many electrical cables as part of aid package?, 
even though the country could make many of those cables locally. The 
justification for this is that these cables are paid for by grants or 
subsidized loans. Nevertheless, significant opportunities to use local 
productive capacities are lost because of the government's failure to 
negotiate with aid donors to obtain raw materials instead of finished 
electrical cables and conductors. 
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The government has embarked on large programmes to increase 
electrical-power generating capacity, rural electrification and telephone 
services. These efforts are financed by foreign loans and grants from 
Canada, Britain, West Germany, Denmark, Yugoslavia and others. Except 
for some domestic expenditures on labour, energy, cement and minor 
inputs, the bulk of the purchases are tied to sources in the donor 
countries. 
In addition to technical issues, the government and the power 
and telecommunications companies evaluate the price, financial conditions 
and the grant or grant equivalent (due to subsidized finance charges) for 
any tender to supply equipment or materials. The grant or grant-equivalent 
is a key consideration; low bids, are often rejected if their grant 
element is small. Since Kenyan companies obviously cannot offer "aid" 
or subsidize finances, it is futile for them to bid for these contracts. 
As a result, Kenya imports much equipment and materials which the country 
has the indtalled capacity and ability to produce locally at competitive 
prices. Due to "aid", local companies were unable to bid for the Kshsl20 
million double circuit line between .Mombasa and Nairobi; the Nyeri-
Thompson Falls-Nakuru-Kisumu line; low voltage conductors and internal 
wiring for Kiambere Dam; and the Kshs.50 million per annum rural 
electrification projects. Both the corporate planning manager for Kenya 
Power and Lighting (KPSL) iand E.A. Cables' management agree^ that 70~8C% 
of the materials for the rural electrification programme could be made locally. 
(7) But due to the grants and zero-interest loans available from Finland and 
Denmark for this programme, all the distribution transformers, 
insulators, conductors and cables will be imported instead of being made 
locally. Moreover, from this experience, KPSL planning manager 
anticipates that local supplies would be economically priced. The 
managing director of E.A. Cables also confidently maintains, "we would like 
to be able to bid head-on against them because we think we can compete". 
And, indeed, they have won various internationally bid supply contracts for 
Kenya and Tanzania. 
Despite the existence of local technical capacity to increase 
substantially the local content in aid projects, neither the government 
nor the telecommunications and electrical power companies have sought 
to depackage the aid below the level of components and thereby enable 
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Kenya to obtain raw materials (e.g. copper and aluminium rods, 
polyvinylchloride plastic) needed to manufacture cables and conductors 
locally. The KP&L Corporate Planning Manager states that: 
Because we have no equity (in the cable manufacturing firmj), 
we have not negotiated to de-package aid supplies. 
This failure can have dire economic consequences. For instance, 
E.A. Cables, which used to supply most of the aluminium conductors for the 
Rural Electrification Programme, lost half and anticipated losing two-
thirds of its previous Kshs.50 million market for these conductors because they 
were being received as a grant for the Rural Electrification Programme. 
Water Pipes 
water 
The Greater Nakuru. / .. Supply Project is financed with French aid 
and executed by a French contractor for Kenya's Ministry of Water 
Development. The water pipes for the project are imported from a 
manufacturer in France and shipped to Mombasa by French transport firms in 
chartered French-registered ships. (8) As mentioned, KENFINCO also 
imports water pipes for its rural water supply orojects. Yet Kenya has 
several factories with the capacity to manufacture Loth plastic and steel 
pipes. Moreover, the local plastic pipe manufactuerers are running at 
merely 35% capacity utilization (Mwangi 1934) and the steel pipe 
manufacturers use merely 13% of their capacity (Coughlin 1985a: 25). 
Kenya would benefit more if the pipes were produced locally and just the 
steel or polyvinychloride (pvc) inputs required to make the pipes were 
tied to French suppliers. 
TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 
The Finance Ministry's Department of External Aid does not 
frequently or consistently seek to receive raw materials instead of finished 
products from aid organizations even though this would increase local 
value added. The Department recognizes the need to "link aid to Kenya's 
own industrialization1' by further increasing local content. (9) Toward this 
end, in 1982, the Cabinet also decided that Kenya should accept tenders 
for projects on an open (component) basis, rather than for "turnkey" projects. 
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Nevertheless, "the implementation of that decision still has to be 
articulated". (10) But the Department of External Aid has no regular 
or institutionalized links to industry; nor does it have economists 
well versed about Kenyan industries on its staff. Intermittent liaison 
with economists in other departments within the Ministry is insufficient; . 
the task requires a full-time economist whose main responsibility is to 
increase the local content in aid projects. Lacking such contacts and 
information about what can be produced locally, the Department is 
ill-positioned to know how to negotiate so as to increase local content. 
Moreover, Kenya exploits only a small portion of its potential 
manoeuvreability in negotiating to increase local sourcing for inputs 
for aid projects. 
A considerable margin sometimes exists for a sharp negotiator 
to align apparently conflicting interests, especially if the scope of the 
negotiations is widened and the recipient adopts a flexible approach. 
In some cases a donor may be amenable to untying the cables, steel 
or other component of a / ro^ecc®5r 'programme grant or loan. For instance, 
recently Tanzania successfully negotiated with Norwegian donors to 
import the raw materials to manufacture cables instead of importing the 
cables funded by aid for use in the local factory making transformers. 
(11) Aid donors to Kenya have also shown some flexibility when requested 
to source locally, e.g. for electrical towers, railway-engine components, 
cement and electrical cables. Opportunities exist. Moreover, various 
competing sources for aid for particular projects often exist; and each 
source imposes different conditions concerning the source from which the 
recipient may obtain inputs for the projects. By diversifying the sources 
of aid, a developing country can reduce the burden of tied aid. 
Triangularization of tied aid has also been suggested whereby aid from the 
donor is used to pay for needed inputs from a third country (Mahbub ul Haq 
1967; 33 5). The third country would then proceed to use the credits to 
make purchases from the original donor. 
I 
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Often the bilateral donor's main interest is to ensure .that most 
of the funds are spent on products from the donor country. Though pressure 
from special interest may exist, the donor country's government may not 
have strong preferences about exactly which products are purchased from 
it. If astute and armed with adequate information about the motivations 
and political situations of various donors, a Third World country's 
negotiators can take advantage of this indifference to assist local 
manufacturers. 
A NEW NEGOTIATING TACTIC 
The key idea proposed here is a tactic for use during negotiations 
for aid so as to increase local sourcing of innuts needed for aided projects. 
It involves persuading the donor to permit the aid receiving country to 
divert project aid funds to purchase different product -- perhaps not 
related to the project -- from the donor country. The recipient country 
would choose to import items from the donor that the recipient does not 
produce and must import anyway. Hence, the recipient would divert trade 
from established sources, and, by choosing from a. wider range of the donor's 
products, select only items available at fairly competitive prices. 
Being financed by aid, these imports would free foreign exchange that 
would have been used to buy them from the previous sources. That foreign 
exchange would — as per agreement — have to be used to finance the local 
production costs plus the cost of the foreign materials or inputs needed 
to produce locally the items needed for the project. Thus the aid would 
become partly untied as to .ommodity and source but remain tied to a specific 
project. This approach would be a restrictive variant of aid tied to 
imports in general. 
An example would help illustrate the approach. Kenya, say, is 
negotiating with West Germany for electrical cables for the Rural 
Electrification Programme though they are locally producible. If 
Germany produces exportable quantities of pvc but not aluminium rods, 
Kenya might agree to import pvc plus some totally unrelated product 
(e.g. steel' billets) instead of finished cables. With the foreign exchange 
Kenya had been using to import steel billets from elsewhere, Kenya could 
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then purchase aluminium rods from any cheap source and still have extra 
foreign exchange. With the pvc and aluminium rods, a local manufacturer 
could be requested to make electrical cables, and be paid with the local 
equivalent of the extra foreign exchange released by the aid-financed 
steel billets. 
The developing country would gain; the donor would not loose. 
So long as the trade diversion did not imply much higher prices, and the 
domestic resource cost ratio -- after considering the usually low opportunity 
cost of using local labour and the often underused local manufacturing 
capacities.-- were favourable, the developing country would earn foreign 
exchange as well as create jobs in local enterprises. If the donor 
negotiated to ensure that the items purchased from it with the aid funds 
would really imply new imports, then it would not loose foreign exchange 
by permitting flexibility. 
This proposed tactic differs from "Mahbub ul Haq's triangularized 
aid credits. He only proposed triangularized credits to decrease the cost 
of tied aid (see Figure IB). But triangularization could also be used 
to stimulate local production (e.g. of cables) by buying raw materials 
with the credits provided as aid instead of buying the final product from 
a third country (see Figure 1C). The tactic proposed here differs from 
even this revised variant of Mahbub ul Haq's triangularized aid in that the 
trade diversion is immediate. Moreover, it would not involve a donor 
in the extra-complicated negotiations with a third country needed to 
ensure that the transfered credits would be used for new imports (see 
Figure ID) as might be variant in Figure 1C. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Aid-tying has many pernicious effects upon manufacturing industries 
in developing countries. The often inflated costs of items so financed, 
the consequently inflated finance charges, plus the inappropriate choices 
of equipment sometimes obtained through tied aid can beleaguer or 
cripple an industry many years after its initial commissioning. 
Moreover, aid-tying can also have severely adverse macroeconomic 
implications for the entire manufacturing sector if there is not sufficient 
foreign exchange to import enough raw materials and spare parts to be 
able to properly use the industrial capacity being installed with the aid. 
Also, as illustrated by .various examples from Kenya, aid-tying can 
directly cause a country to stifle some of its own local industries by 
importing locally producible items as part of aid-financed packages. To 
avert some of the more negative results of aid-tying, a developing 
country's aid negotiators need to be thoroughly informed of the industrial 
fcapabilities of their own country so as to know which components of an 
aid project are locally producible. They also require systematic 
information about the various donors' motivations and political 
circumstances that might influence their flexibility toward aid during 
negotiations. 
By using flexible and better-informed negotiating tactics, astute 
Third World negotiators may well be able to decrease the cost of tied aid 
and stimulate more local production for aid projects. Toward this end, the 
article proposes an additional tactic for negotiating to receive raw 
materials instead of final goods and equipment financed by tied aid. The 
interests of the donor country to seeing its aid funds spent on its own 
products may be reconcilable with the recipient's desire to promote its 
industries — if some creative flexibility is shown by both sides. 
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1. This article contains significant portions adapted from Mwau and 
Coughlin (1985) and Begumisa and Coughlin (1986). 
2. For reference see: Kappagoda 1978: 7-8; Payer 1974; Miksell 1986: 
246-7; Mattrick 1967: 97-99- Wightman 1971. 
3. A legitimate question -- outside the scope of this paper — is, 
"Who is aiding who?" Whole aid programmes have been turned on or off 
in order to stabilize, intimidate or unseat regimes (e.g. "Israel, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile) seen as 
friendly or antagonistic to the donors. For instance, as shown 
statistically, the concerns of power politics have been much more 
important in the allocation of US aid than "the economic and 
political structure and performance" of developing•countries 
(McKinlay and Mughan 1984: 247). Moreover, despite aid, the net 
resource flows are overwhelmingly toward the developed countries 
(the donors) after one counts the large repatriations of interest, 
dividends, royalties and fees, and the massive outflows of funds and 
resources from developing countries as a result of transfer pricing 
and the brain-drain. This resource drain inspires questions about 
whether "aid" and aid personnel are sometimes provided to buttress 
friendly political forces within developing countries so as to 
continue the net extraction of resources. Advocates of this view, 
of course, recognize that some donors do not have such manipulative 
purposes, others are quite inconsistent in their goals, and most of 
the aid personnel are well-intentioned even though they sometimes 
unwittingly serve the grander designs of realpolitik. On the other 
hand, by ignoring many well-documented cases to the contrary, 
Mosley (1987: 43-44), for example, discounts the importance of donor 
efforts to impose policy conditions; and he rejects the claim that 
"aid ... has returned to the function of sustaining colonial 
structures and relationships", 
4. Ministry of Water Development, Borehole Registry, Drilling, Legal and 
Water Bailiff Sections (Interviews, 20 May 1982, 8 June 1982, 
August 1983, May-June 1984, and 7 December 1984). 
5. According to Mr. Timo Vuori (Project Manager, KENFINCO was 
established by the two Finnish multinationals of YIT Limited 
(general engineering and contracting company) and Finnin Consult 
(Consulting Engineers). 
6. Timo Vuori, Project Manager, Interview, 22 March 1985. 
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7. A study of Kenya's water pumps industry in 1982 enumerated six 
manufacturers, ten assemblers, and seventeen large importers. 
Although the study focused on motor-driven centrifugal water 
pumps, it also revealed that 1,300 reciprocating pumps — only 
some of which were handpumps -- were imported and sold in Kenya. 
Reciprocating pumps constituted 19% of all water pumps sold in 
1980 (Begumisa 1982: 51-54), 
8. Interview with Mr. Hinpal S. Jabal, Chief Planning Officer, Kenya 
Power' and Lighting Company, 31 May 1985. 
9. The Standard, Nairobi, Tuesday 27 December 1984, p.7. 
10. Interview with Dr. Dang'ana, Director of External Aid, Ministry of 
Finance and Planning, 3 June 1985. Dr. Dang'ana had been 
appointed to this position only a few weeks before the time of this 
interview. Obviously, he is not accountable for the prior 
management of the department. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Interview on 7 August 1986 with Dr. Samuel Wangwe who served NORAD 
as a consultant with TANELEC Limited, a producer of electric 
transformers, 
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